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Bones, Bombs and Break Points 
The Geography of Economic Activity 
 
I. Introduction 
  In the last decade, the field of economic geography has enjoyed a renaissance.
1 The 
central question in this literature is how to explain the distribution of economic activity across 
space – across countries of the world, across regions within a country, and across cities. Three 
principal theoretical approaches have emerged, which may be termed increasing returns; random 
growth; and locational fundamentals. The increasing returns theories posit that advantages of 
size may arise from knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, or the advantages of proximity 
for both suppliers and demanders in a world of costly trade. In this approach, a distribution of 
city sizes may arise from technological characteristics of individual industries (Henderson 1974) 
or from the tacit competition among locations for mobile factors of production (Krugman 1991). 
The random growth theory (Simon 1955, Gabaix 1999) holds that a distribution of cities of quite 
different sizes emerges from very simple stochastic processes. One large advantage of this 
approach is that it is able to explain a key empirical regularity known as Zipf’s Law regarding 
the distribution of city sizes that, to date, the increasing returns theories cannot explain. The 
locational fundamentals theory (Krugman 1996) may be thought of as a variant of the random 
growth theory. Instead of city growth itself being random, it is fundamental economic 
characteristics of locations that are random. If we posit that these characteristics are distributed 
according to the same process as in Gabaix (1999), then the locational fundamentals theory also 
can account for Zipf’s Law. However, in contrast to the random growth theory, the locational 
                                                 
1Paul Krugman has argued that the study of the spatial location of economic activity should assume a stature in the 
profession equal to one of the flagship fields such as international trade [Paul R. Krugman 1995]. A new Journal of 
Economic Geography has been founded. While demurring from some of Krugman’s strongest claims, J. Peter 
Neary, writing a review article in the Journal of Economic Literature, declares “New economic geography has come 
of age” [Neary 2001, p. 536].   3 
fundamentals story predicts that the size of specific locations should be robust even to large 
temporary shocks.
2 
  In this paper, we will examine these three theories empirically. A few key questions 
emerge. How important are scale economies in explaining the degree of spatial concentration of 
economic activity?
3 The premise that we work from is that the forces of increasing returns must 
be vastly stronger in a modern, knowledge-based economy than in more primitive, agricultural or 
pre-agricultural, economies. To investigate this, we employ a unique data set on Japanese 
regional population over the past 8,000 years. The answer that we provide has two parts. First, 
for the 8,000 years in our data set, there has always been a great deal of variation in measures of 
regional population density. This alone suggests that important factors other than increasing 
returns help to explain the variation in the density of economic activity. Second, there has been a 
notable rise in concentration in the last century as Japan industrialized and become ever more 
integrated into the world economy. This suggests that the increasing returns theories may help to 
account for the rise in dispersion.  
  The same data set can be employed to address a second key question. Over tens, 
hundreds or thousands of years, how much persistence should we expect in the identity of the 
most densely settled regions? The increasing returns theories do not answer with a single voice. 
Insofar as the size distribution is tied to technological characteristics of particular industries, then 
                                                 
2 It is tempting to say that one of the main things missing from the new economic geography is geography! This 
would be a bit too strong, since Fujita and Mori (1996), for example have a very nice paper on the role of ports. 
More typical, though, is a tendency to focus almost exclusively on factors with no real geographical counterpart, as 
in the survey by Fujita and Thisse (1996): “The main reasons for the formation of economic clusters involving firms 
and/or households are analyzed: (i) externalities under perfect competition; (ii) increasing returns under 
monopolistic competition; and (iii) spatial competition under strategic interaction.” 
3 Indeed, FKV have staked strong claims for the IR theories: “[T]he dramatic spatial unevenness of the real economy 
– the disparities between densely populated manufacturing belts and thinly populated farm belts, between congested 
cities and desolate rural areas; the spectacular concentration of particular industries in Silicon Valleys and 
Hollywoods – is surely the result not of inherent differences among locations but of some set of cumulative 
processes, necessarily involving some form of increasing returns, whereby geographic concentration can be self-
reinforcing.” [FKV, p. 2].   4 
as we move from hunter-gatherer societies, to agriculture-based societies, through feudalism, 
into and out of autarky, and finally to a modern industrial economy, one might guess that there 
would be radical shifts over time in which are the densely populated regions. On the other hand, 
an important strand within the increasing returns theories has stressed the role of path 
dependence (David 2000, Krugman 1991b). An early start in one location provides that site with 
advantages at each succeeding stage of locational competition. The random growth theory is 
likewise consistent with correlation across long stretches of time in the spatial density of 
particular locations so long as the variance of growth rates is not too large relative to the mean 
growth rate. The clearest prediction comes from the locational fundamentals theory, which 
would hold that many of the crucial characteristics for locations have changed little over time 
even if the economic meaning may have evolved. For example, there are advantages of being 
near a river, on the coast, on a plain instead of a mountain or desert, etc. Our empirical results 
strongly confirm that there is a great deal of persistence across time in which are the densely 
settled regions. For the increasing returns theory, this would stress the importance of path 
dependence. For the random growth theory, this requires that the variance of growth have not 
been too high. However, we believe that this persistence arises most naturally from the locational 
fundamentals story and suggests this may be an important component of a complete answer. 
  Finally, the theories have quite distinct stories to tell about how the distribution of city 
sizes will be affected by a powerful, but temporary, shock. The increasing returns literature, as 
noted earlier, has given a prominent role to path dependence as well as to the possibility of 
catastrophes in which even small shocks may give rise to large and irreversible structural   5 
changes in relative city sizes.
4 By looking at a large shock, one can gauge how important these 
theoretical possibilities of catastrophic spatial change are in practice. The pure random growth 
theory predicts that growth follows a random walk. All shocks have permanent effects. By 
contrast, the locational fundamentals story holds that so long as the shock is purely temporary, 
even strong shocks should shortly be reversed, as the advantages of the particular locations 
reassert themselves in relatively rapid growth rates on the path to recovery.  
The particular experiment that we consider is the Allied bombing of Japanese cities 
during World War II. This is one of the most powerful shocks to relative city sizes that the world 
has ever experienced. We find that, in the wake of the destruction, there was an extremely 
powerful recovery. Most cities returned to their relative position in the distribution of city sizes 
within about fifteen years. This strikes most strongly at the random growth theory, which 
predicts no reversion to the prior path. For the increasing returns theory, this suggests that 
however appealing the theoretical possibility of spatial catastrophes, in practice the distribution 
of city sizes seems to be highly robust to temporary shocks even of great magnitude. Finally, the 
reversion to the prior growth path would seem to be a strong confirmation of a locational 
fundamentals theory.  
  In sum, our experiments are very problematic for the pure random growth theory. While 
this theory provides a foundation for understanding Zipf’s Law, it fails utterly to predict the great 
robustness of particular locations to strong temporary shocks. For the increasing returns theory, 
the message is more nuanced. There has long been a great deal of spatial dispersion of economic 
activity, so increasing returns is not necessary to explain this. Nonetheless, in the last century 
there has been a substantial rise in the degree of spatial dispersion, and this well might be 
                                                 
4 For example, Krugman (1998) writes: “The new work is highly suggestive, particularly in indicating how historical 
accident can shape economic geography, and how gradual changes in underlying parameters can produce 
discontinuous change in spatial structure.”   6 
accounted for by increasing returns. The emphasis within the increasing returns literature on the 
possibility of spatial catastrophes in the distribution of city sizes seems to be of greater interest 
theoretically than empirically. Finally, the locational fundamentals theory fares quite well in our 
empirical investigations. It has an advantage over the increasing returns theory in that it provides 
a simple account of Zipf’s Law. It can provide a consistent story about why there has been a 
great deal of spatial dispersion over long stretches of time. It can explain why there has been a 
great deal of persistence in which regions are most densely settled. And it can explain why 
specific locations are highly robust even to temporary shocks of great magnitude. The one 
weakness is that it does not provide a reason why the degree of concentration in Japan should 
have increased in the last century. 
  These considerations lead us to believe that the most promising direction for research is 
to consider a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals play a key role in establishing the 
basic pattern of relative regional densities and in which increasing returns plays a strong role in 
determining the degree of concentration.  
 
II. Bones: Archaeology, History and Economic Geography 
A. The Data 
In this section, we examine 8,000 years of data on Japanese regions in order to address 
key questions concerning variation and persistence of regional population densities. Historically, 
how large has the variation in regional population density been and are there important changes 
over time? And how persistent is the identity of the regions that have been most densely settled? 
We then discuss the results in light of the three theories noted above.   7 
The data that we bring to bear is of two main types.
5 As we move back in time two 
millennia and more, one has access neither to regional accounts nor to population censuses. 
However, Koyama (1978) provides detailed data on the number of archaeological sites, including 
28,013 from the Jomon period (-6,000 to –300) and another 10,530 sites from the Yayoi period  
(-300 to 300). These have been divided according to the 46 modern prefectures in which they are 
located. We take a count of these archaeological sites for the respective periods as a proxy for the 
level of economic activity in the prefectures.  
The second type of data is population. In order to provide a basis for taxation, Japan 
began censuses of population quite early. This was done at a regional level because of the 
substantial autonomy of local lords. Kito (1996) provides the best estimates of regional 
population for 68 provinces (kuni) for the period beginning in 725 and ending in 1872. In 1920 
regional censuses began using a system based on 46 prefectures (ken), and this system continues 
through our most recent data for the year 1998.
6 Often we will find it convenient to work with 
data that allows a comparison across all of these periods of time. A quite close match between 
the data sets can be achieved when we aggregate up to 39 regions. Kito (1996) also provides 
estimates of total population of Japan for the Jomon and Yayoi periods. 
We need to discuss the unit of analysis. A great deal of work on economic geography 
considers cities rather than regions as the unit of analysis. We do have data on cities, and we will 
discuss it, but this data extends back only to 1925. All of our earlier data concerns regions, which 
thus must be the unit of analysis. There are, nonetheless, good reasons why one might prefer the 
regional data. The first is that since the definition of a city always involves a threshold, even 
purely uniform growth of population in all locations may appear non-uniform because 
                                                 
5 Details on data construction are discussed in Appendix I. 
6 The move to prefectures occurred earlier, but the 1920 census is the first to use these categories.   8 
populations may cross the threshold in some locations but not others. A second reason is that, 
especially over long stretches of time, the appropriate definition of cities changes. For example, 
areas that are considered core parts of modern Tokyo would not have been thought of as part of 
historical Tokyo (Edo). It is not at all clear how one should or could deal with such issues. Third, 
for some of our early periods, virtually all of the population lived outside of anything that in 
modern terms would be thought of as a city. Taken together, these factors suggest that the turn to 
regional data may be a necessity, but it is one with many virtues. 
By focusing on regional data, one transformation becomes absolutely essential. 
Differences in region sizes are large and the demarcation between regions does not always 
correspond to an obvious economic rationale. This suggests that we work not with the raw 
regional population, but instead with the population deflated by the regional area. This measure 
of regional population density will be the unit of analysis for this portion of our study.
7 
One of the key reasons for turning to the historical data is that economies of the remote 
past look quite different from the modern economy. By examining such data, we are able to 
abstract from forces that we think are important today, but much less so in earlier times. Hence it 
is also important to have in mind the principal features of the earlier economies (as outlined in 
Table 1). Our earliest data on archaeological sites of the Jomon period (-6,000 to –300) takes us 
back to the Stone Age. The economy is based on hunting and gathering. There are no metal tools 
or agriculture, although there is evidence of pottery. The Yayoi period (-300 to 300) is a 
revolutionary time, with the introduction of primitive forms of agriculture, metallurgy and some 
coins. As yet, there is neither writing nor cloth. Our next stop in history is the year 725. A feudal 
regime had risen and we have the first population census. Writing is well developed and farming 
is widespread. The capital is in Nara. By 800, the capital has moved to Kyoto and greater 
                                                 
7 Rappaport and Sachs (2001) also focus on regional population densities in the U.S. for similar reasons.   9 
protection of peasant property rights has encouraged more widespread cultivation. The next 
century would see more extensive usage of metal farm tools, raising productivity. By 1150, 
Japan was racked by instability and civil war, particularly in the North. By 1600, the 
reunification of Japan was complete and there is extensive trade and contact with the West. Japan 
is a major regional power. By the 1630s, however, Japan began more than two centuries of self-
imposed isolation. By 1721, the capital moved to Tokyo and population movement became more 
restricted. Even as late as 1798, fully 80 percent of the population was farmers, about 6 percent 
nobility, with the remainder merchants and artisans. By the 1870s, Japan witnessed a civil war, 
the end of the Shogun’s government, a jump from autarky to free trade, and the subsidized 
import of Western technology. This can be thought of as the very start of Japan’s industrial 
revolution. By the 1920s, industrialization and the accompanying militarization are in full swing. 
Japan is a major exporter of silk and textiles. Nonetheless, approximately 50 percent of the work 
force is still composed of farmers. By 1998, of course, Japan is a highly industrialized society, 
with farmers now comprising only 5 percent of the population. Tokyo is one of the world’s great 
cities with a population of 12 million. In sum, our data covers Japan from the Stone Age to the 
modern era. 
 
B. Population and Variation in Regional Density 
We begin by examining the evolution of the total population of Japan. The main features 
are developed in Table 1. Kito (1996) estimates that the population in Jomon period Japan would 
have been approximately 125,000; by 1998, it would fall just shy of 120 million. In short, our 
data encompasses a period in which Japanese population rises by a factor of nearly one thousand. 
If we restrict attention to the period for which we have censuses, i.e. from 725 to 1998, the   10 
population rises from 4.5 million to nearly 120 million. That is, our census data encompasses a 
period in which total Japanese population rises by a factor greater than 25. From the Jomon 
period through about 1721, the broad trend is substantial population growth. In large measure, 
this reflects the development of agriculture and its implements, extension of regions of 
cultivation, and establishment of institutions that encouraged investments in the land. For the 
next century and a half, through the 1870s, there is very little population growth. In the next 
hundred and twenty years, through 1998, Japanese population would double twice over, rising 
from 30 to 120 million. 
There are several measures one can give of variation in regional population density. A 
very coarse but simple measure is the share of population accounted for by the five most 
populous regions. This concentration was quite high, at 39 percent, in the Jomon period. This 
appears to reflect the fact that without agriculture, metal tools, or clothing, major sections of 
Japan were virtually uninhabitable. From here through the dawn of the twentieth century, the 
share of the five largest regions typically hovered around 20 percent, occasionally rising toward 
30 percent. Remarkably, by the end of the twentieth century, the share of the five most populous 
regions would rise above 40 percent. 
A second measure of regional variation is what may be termed the relative variance of 
log population density, which measures variance in proportional terms. To get this, first take logs 
of the regional population densities. For each period, this allows us to compute a variance of the 
log population densities. If we now normalize this by the same measure of variation for 1998, we 
get a measure that is above unity if the variation is greater in the historical period than in modern 
Japan and below unity in the reverse case. 
8 
                                                 
8 An advantage of using this measure over simply using the variance in population density is that the former is 
invariant to average density while the latter tends to rise with it.  The reason for this is that as population, and hence   11 
A first observation is that regional population variation is substantially higher in the 
modern period than at all prior dates except the Jomon and Yayoi periods. Again, one reason 
there is so much variation in the Jomon and Yayoi periods is simply that the economies were so 
primitive that major sections of Japan were almost uninhabitable. A second observation is that all 
of the censuses from 700 to 1600 show a great deal of variation in regional population density – 
typically two-thirds to three-fourths of the modern variation. Indeed an F-test reveals that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that variance in regional population density in any year prior to 1721 
was the same as the modern variance (at the 5 percent level).  Interestingly, the data from 1721 
through 1872 show, the closure of Japan seems to have been accompanied by a substantial 
reduction in regional population variation. A plausible reason is that eight out of the twelve 
densest regions in 1600 comprised port cities whose share of population declined markedly over 
this time period.
9  Closure to trade probably dramatically reduced the value of locating in a port 
relative to remaining in farming.
10 Finally, the re-opening of Japan and the development of the 
modern economy gave rise to a substantial increase in regional variation in population density. 
We can also examine a third measure of variation in regional density, the Zipf coefficient. 
We have already noted, in reference to the random growth theory, that there is an empirical 
regularity known as Zipf’s Law for Cities. To understand this, rank the cities by population and 
now take logs of both the rank of the city and of its population. Zipf’s Law for Cities holds that a 
regression of the log rank against log population will have a slope of minus unity. Gabaix (1999) 
reports a slope of –1.004 for the United States and Rosen and Resnick (1980) report slopes for a 
variety of OECD countries, many of which are reasonably close to minus unity.  
                                                                                                                                                             
average density, rises, the same proportional density differences produce higher absolute variations in density.  
Since we wanted to sweep this effect out of the data, we calculate variance based on log population density. 
9 These were Chiba, Fukuoka, Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo, Yokkaichi, and Yokohama. 
10 Other policies may also have affected city sizes such as the construction of castle-towns, tax evasion in rural 
areas, and declining finances for samurai [See Hall (1968) and Hanley and Yamamura (1977)]   12 
In this context, the magnitude of the Zipf coefficient provides information about variation 
in regional density. If there were only trivial variation in regional population density, then the 
Zipf slope would be close to minus infinity. If virtually all of the population were clustered in a 
single region, the Zipf coefficient would be close to zero. Hence when the magnitude of the Zipf 
coefficient is small, the variation is large. Here we will report Zipf coefficients computed not on 
city populations but on regional population densities. As we will see, this transformation does 
little to disturb the basic relation.  
One should not directly run Zipf-style regressions on historical data since the population 
data is surely measured with error.  In order to obtain unbiased estimates, we need an instrument 
correlated with historical population data but not correlated with the measurement error in that 
survey.  An obvious instrument that fits the need is modern population density, since it is 
strongly correlated with historical density but not with historical census errors.  We therefore 
used density in 1998 as an instrument for earlier census data.  We had a different problem with 
the Jomon and Yayoi data.  Urban density in 1998 is not a good instrument, since archaeological 
discoveries might be correlated with modern construction.  However, since most Japanese 
archaeological discoveries of Jomon and Yayoi sites occurred since 1960 [see Koyama (1978)], 
we used 1920 density data as an instrument for these regressions. 
Table 1 reports the Zipf coefficient for each of our time periods. The broad story that it 
tells confirms the results from the prior non-parametric statistics. Dispersion was relatively high 
in the Jomon and Yayoi periods – indeed very close to fitting Zipf’s Law. Regional variation in 
density declined modestly for the period 725 to 1600, before declining sharply in the period in 
which Japan was closed to the West. Since Japan reopened and began its industrialization,   13 
regional variation has increased substantially, reaching a Zipf coefficient of –0.96 in 1998.
 11 The 
coefficients are quite precisely estimated.  With the exception of the Jomon period, which has a 
standard error of 0.22, our standard errors on the Zipf coefficient range from 0.03 in 1998 to 0.17 
in the year 900.  We cannot statistically distinguish the modern coefficient from that in 1600 or 
any prior date.  
Our examination of 8,000 years of Japanese regional data reveals three important facts. 
First, regional population densities have always varied greatly in Japan. This is true in the Stone 
Age, at the dawn of the agricultural revolution, during the long period of feudalism, and it 
remains true in modern industrial Japan. Indeed, with the exception of Stone Age Japan, our 
spread of Zipf coefficients is well within the range of coefficients that one would find in a 
sample of OECD countries [cf. Rosen and Resnick (1980)].
12 Second, the closure of Japan to 
trade for more than two centuries was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the variation of 
regional population density. Large port-based regions appear to have lost ground relative to 
regions directed more exclusively to national activity. Third, the industrial revolution in Japan, 
coming hand in hand with its re-opening to international trade, does seem to have promoted a 
very high degree of regional concentration and variation in regional population density.  
 
C. Persistence in Regional Population Densities 
We now turn to consider persistence in the identity of the regions that are densely settled. 
Table 1 reports both raw and rank correlations between the regional population densities in the 
                                                 
11 On first blush, this might appear to conflict with the results of Eaton and Eckstein (1997) that showed the stability 
of the Zipf coefficients for Japanese cities over the period 1925-1985. Here the difference between their use of city 
data and our use of regional data is crucial, since this suggests that even if there is little change in the distribution of 
city sizes, there may be important spatial correlation among cities that are growing, which could explain the 
increased variation in regional densities. 
12 Rosen and Resnick (1980) estimate the Zipf relationship for a broad set of countries using a comparable number 
of observations.  Within the OECD countries in their sample, Zipf coefficients range from − 0.88 to − 1.96.   14 
various periods with those for 1998. Consider first the Jomon data, dating from Japan’s Stone 
Age (-6,000 to –300). The raw and rank correlations of the density of archaeological sites from 
this period and 1998 regional population density are 0.53 and 0.31 respectively. The higher raw 
correlation especially captures the fact that the most densely settled regions are common in the 
two periods. The lower rank correlation captures the fact that large sections of Japan were 
relatively untouched by the Jomon people and so the rankings among these are weak.  
Consider next the Yayoi period (-300 to 300). Agriculture and metallurgy are just being 
introduced. Writing has not yet appeared. In the next two millennia, total population will rise by 
a factor of 200. If we know the distribution of the regional density of archaeological sites from 
the Yayoi period, how much information would we expect this to provide about the distribution 
of modern regional population densities? The raw and rank correlations are 0.67 and 0.50 
respectively. Given that two millennia of Japanese history separate these dates, with the 
accompanying economic transformations, we consider this persistence to be quite remarkable. 
In moving to the year 725, we now are able to work with the first census data and ask the 
same questions. A feudal regime is in place. The vast majority of the population is agricultural. 
Nonetheless, the raw and rank correlations of regional population densities in 725 and 1998 are 
0.60 and 0.71 respectively. Again, these show a remarkable persistence. 
We will not discuss every date. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a general trend that raw 
and rank correlations with modern regional densities rise pretty steadily. We will cite just one 
last date. If we look four centuries back to the year 1600, a time in which Japan had a population 
just over 10 percent of its modern population, the raw and rank correlations with the modern 
regional densities are 0.76 and 0.83 respectively.   15 
In sum, it is absolutely striking how much persistence there is in the distribution of 
regional population density throughout Japanese history. The high correlations trace back 
virtually to the Stone Age. The correlations between modern regional densities and those of 
Japan four centuries ago are remarkably strong. Persistence is a very strong feature of the data. 
 
III. Bombs and Break Points 
Imagine a calamity destroys a large share of a city’s productive capacity and drastically 
reduces its population. Will this temporary shock have permanent effects? Or is there a strong 
tendency for locations to be robust even to large temporary shocks so that this city will shortly 
revert to its former place in the constellation of cities? An ideal experiment would have several 
key features. The shocks would be large, highly variable, clearly identifiable and purely 
temporary. In this section, we will consider the Allied bombing of Japanese cities during World 
War II as precisely such an experiment. 
 
A. Data 
Our data covers 303 Japanese cities with population in excess of 30,000 in 1925. 
Population is recorded at five-year intervals between 1925 and 1965, with the exception that the 
regular 1945 census is delayed until 1947 due to disruption from the war. These data allow us to 
compute population growth rates for the pre-war period, 1925-1940; the period of the war itself 
and its immediate aftermath, 1940-1947; and two measures of the recovery period, 1947-1960 
and 1947-1965.
13  
One measure of the intensity of the shocks will be the dead and missing city residents due 
to war actions. The missing are included because the magnitude of the shocks frequently made 
                                                 
13 More detail is provided in the Appendix.   16 
recovery of bodies impossible, as for example with those vaporized by the Hiroshima nuclear 
blast. In order to have a measure of the intensity of the shocks, the dead and missing will 
typically enter deflated by the number of city residents in 1940. A second measure of the 
intensity of the shocks will be the number of buildings destroyed per resident. We also at times 
report the percentage of the built up area destroyed for the 66 Japanese cities covered by the 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 
If we are to understand the impact of private actions that may lead cities to recover, it is 
important to control for government actions. The Japan Statistical Yearbook provides data on 
expenditures from US and Japanese government sources designated for the reconstruction of war 
damage in each prefecture.  We allocate these among the cities within the prefecture in 
proportion to the shares of buildings destroyed in that prefecture. These are divided by the 
population in the city in 1947 to create our variable, “government reconstruction expenses,” 
which is thousands of yen per capita spent by the government to reconstruct a city.  These 
geographically-directed expenditures are quite small.  For example, most food aid, income 
assistance, and industrial subsidy programs did not discriminate on the basis of location, and 
therefore do not count as regional subsidies.  Interestingly, rural prefectures, which typically 
sustained less war damage, received significantly more aid relative to the number of buildings 
destroyed than more urban areas.  This was probably due to Japan’s long-term policy of 
subsidizing rural districts at the expense of urban ones. 
 
 
 B. Magnitude of the Shocks   17 
The Allied strategic bombing in World War II devastated Japanese cities. It targeted 
sixty-six cities. The bombing destroyed almost half of all structures in these cities – a total of 2.2 
million buildings. Two-thirds of productive capacity vanished. Three hundred thousand Japanese 
were killed. Forty percent of the population was rendered homeless. Some cities lost as much as 
half of their population owing to deaths, missing, and refugees.
14  
The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are, of course, well known. The first 
atomic weapon was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and was the equivalent of 12 
kilotons of TNT. The temperature at the blast site is believed to have surpassed one million 
degrees Celsius. Over two-thirds of the built up area of the city was destroyed. The blast may 
have killed as many as 80,000 people – more than 20 percent of Hiroshima’s population. The 
second atomic weapon was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9 and had a power nearly twice that 
of Hiroshima, at 22 kilotons. The hilly topography of Nagasaki and the fact that the bomb missed 
its target by a wide margin kept the destruction of the built up area under 40 percent. Still, more 
than 25,000 were killed or went missing, approximately 8.5 percent of city residents. 
While the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are widely known among the 
public in the West, the devastation of other Japanese cities is much less well known. An example 
of the magnitude of the destruction is a single firebombing raid on Tokyo the night of March 9, 
1945. United States B-29 Superfortress bombers, based in the Marianas Islands, flew more than 
300-strong over Tokyo that night. Under a new strategy devised by General Curtis LeMay, the 
bombers flew with minimal defenses and at low altitudes. This allowed them to maximize the 
payload of napalm incendiaries and to release these at precise intervals. Tokyo had received no 
rain in a week and the wind that night blew at 25 miles per hour. Tokyo, a city of straw, paper, 
and wood, lay in wait. The B-29 Superfortresses flew over Tokyo for just three hours on March 
                                                 
14 These numbers are from USSBS (1947).   18 
9, dropping 1.7 kilotons of napalm incendiaries. This unleashed a firestorm. Rivers boiled. 
Asphalt streets liquefied and burst into flame. The results were devastating. Sixteen square miles 
of Tokyo were reduced to ash. At least 80,000 people were killed in that raid alone (Werrell p. 
162-3).  
The magnitude of destruction in the March 9 raid on Tokyo was large not only by 
Japanese standards; when it happened, it was the deadliest single-day air attack in the history of 
the world. The number of people killed was of the same order of magnitude as the nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima. Japan suffered more civilian casualties in that one raid than Britain 
suffered in all of World War II. And this was just the beginning. By the end of the war, the US 
had destroyed more square miles of Tokyo than the combined destruction in the fifteen most 
heavily bombed German cities [Werrell (1996) p. 32].  
  A major reason why Tokyo stands out in Japanese data is due to the fact that with a 1940 
population of 7.3 million it was by far the largest target in Japan. Given that Tokyo was sixteen 
times the size of Hiroshima and more than twenty times the size of Nagasaki, even nuclear 
bombs could not kill as many people in these smaller cities. This suggests the value of 
considering destruction in proportional rather than absolute terms. Seen this way, the destruction 
in the course of the war of 56 square miles of Tokyo only amounted to 50.8 percent of its built 
up area (USSBS p. 42). This is actually just under the median percentage of urban destruction of 
50.9 percent for the 66 targeted cities. In short, in terms of the destruction of built up area for the 




                                                 
15 The Allies dropped 17 pounds of incendiaries per capita on the median firebombed city, but only 4 pounds per 
capita on Tokyo.  Tokyo nonetheless still stands out for the number who died. It seems likely that in smaller cities 
there was greater opportunity to escape the firestorms.   19 
C. Variance of the Shocks 
  While the magnitude of the shocks to city sizes was large, there was also a great deal of 
variability in these shocks. In fact, approximately 80 percent of the 300 cities in our sample, 
collectively representing 37 percent of the urban population, were virtually untouched by the 
bombings. This includes large cities. Kyoto, the fifth largest city at the beginning of the war, was 
not bombed at all.
16 Given the city’s historical significance, it was believed that its destruction 
might strengthen the Japanese will to resist. The large cities of Niigata and Kitakyushu escaped 
substantial damage because they were preserved as potential nuclear bomb targets. Cities in the 
North of Japan, such as Sapporo, escaped heavy bombing because they were largely out of range 
of US bomber forces.  
  Even among those cities that did suffer firebombing, there is a high degree of variability 
in the destruction. One reason is learning by doing. The creation of a firestorm from napalm 
incendiaries depended on having a sufficient number of planes, dropping the incendiaries in 
precise patterns and at relatively close intervals. While some tests of the incendiaries had been 
conducted on mock Japanese cities at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, it was only as a 
result of the experience of actual bombing raids that US forces achieved the optimal pattern. 
Moreover, cities such as Nagoya, which were firebombed early, had as a result of those raids the 
equivalent of firebreaks within the city. In the subsequent raids, it became nearly impossible to 
create highly destructive firestorms.  
In addition, there were a large number of other factors at work that created variance in the 
destruction of cities. These include the steady growth in the number of B-29s available for 
service; the evolving defense capabilities of the Japanese cities (which was important notably for 
                                                 
16 Our definition of “virtually untouched” is casualties of under 100.  Hammel (1998) reports no air attacks on 
Kyoto.  Nakamura and Miyazaki (1995) do report 82 casualties in Kyoto (1940 Pop. 1.1 million) due to the war.   
Presumably these were due to targeting errors, strafing, and/or Kyoto residents who were killed in other cities.   20 
Osaka); the topography of specific cities; and sheer fortune, as in the fact that Nagasaki was 
bombed only when the primary target, Kokura (now Kitakyushu), could not be visually 
identified due to cloud cover. 
 
D. Temporary Nature of the Shocks 
Rarely does one find shocks that can so clearly be identified as temporary. For much of 
World War II, Japanese cities were simply out of range of US bombers. In the first year of the 
war, the US managed only the single “Doolittle raid” on Japan from a US carrier, and this had 
little more than psychological impact. Later, the US tried to use China as a base for attacks on 
Japanese cities. But the long flights required and the difficult supply lines insured that these had 
only minimal effect. It was only with the capture of the Marianas islands as a B-29 base, the 
seizure of Iwo Jima (which lay directly between the Marianas and Japan) as a base for fighter 
escorts, a rise in the number of planes available, and the introduction of new tactics by General 
LeMay that the US attacks reached an apogee. The most powerful attacks were compressed in 
the last five months of the war. 
While the devastation of many of these cities was powerful, once the flames were out, the 
geographical characteristics of particular locations are affected little or not at all. The one 
possible exception, of course, is the lingering radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This will 
make these particularly interesting cases to see whether they were special cases in the period of 
recovery from the war. 
 
E. Impact of the Shocks: Temporary or Permanent?   21 
  We now inquire whether temporary shocks have permanent effects on relative city sizes. 
Let Sit be city i’s share of total population at time t, and let sit be the natural logarithm of this 
share.  Suppose further that each city has an initial size Ω i and is buffeted by city-specific shocks 
ε it. In this case we can write the size of any city at any point in time as, 
  it i it s ε =Ω +  (1) 
We can model the persistence in these shocks to population shares as:  
  11 it it it ε ρ εν ++ =+  (2) 
The parameter ρ  ∈  [0,1] and the innovation, ν it, is an iid error term.  
  We examine the evolution of this system by first differencing equation (1).   This yields 
  11 it it it it ss εε ++ −= −  (3) 
If we substitute equation (2) into equation (3), we then obtain 
  () () 11 1 11 it it it it it ssρ νν ρρε ++ − −= − + + −    (4) 
The key parameter is ρ , which tells us how much of a temporary shock is dissipated in one 
period. If ρ  = 1, then all shocks are permanent and city size follows a random walk.
17 In this 
case,  
  11 it it it ss ν ++ =+  (5) 
If ρ  ∈  [0,1), then city share is stationary and any shock will dissipate over time.  In other words, 
these two hypotheses can be distinguished by identifying the parameter ρ .   
  One approach to investigating the magnitude of ρ  is to search for a unit root. It is well 
known that unit root tests usually have little power to separate ρ  < 1 from ρ  = 1.  This is due to 
the fact that in traditional unit root tests the innovations are not observable and so identify ρ  with 
                                                 
17 Equation (5) is identical with the key equation in Gabaix (1999).   22 
very large standard errors.  A major advantage of our data set is that we can easily identify the 
innovations due to bombing.  In particular, since by hypothesis the innovation, ν it, is uncorrelated 
with the term in square brackets, then if we can identify the innovation, we can obtain an 
unbiased estimate of ρ . 
  An obvious method of looking at the innovation is to use the growth rate from 1940 to 
1947.  However, this measure of the innovation may contain not only information about the 
bombing but also past growth rates.  This is a measurement error problem that could bias our 
estimates in either direction depending on ρ .
18 In order to solve this, we instrument the growth 
rate from 1940-47 with buildings destroyed per capita and deaths per capita.  
  We can obtain a general feel for the data by considering the impact of bombing on city 
growth rates.  As we argued earlier, if city growth rates follow a random walk, then all shocks to 
cities should be permanent.  In this case, one should expect to see no relationship between 
historical shocks and future growth rates.  Moreover, if one believes that there is positive serial 
correlation in the data, then one should expect to see a positive correlation between past and 
future growth rates.  By contrast, if one believes that location specific factors are crucial in 
understanding the distribution of population, then one should expect to see a negative 
relationship between a historical shock and the subsequent growth rate.   In Figure 1 we present a 
plot of population growth between 1947 and 1960 with that between 1940 and 1947.  The sizes 
of the circles represent the population of the city in 1925.  The figure reveals a very clear 
negative relationship the two growth rates. This indicates that cities that suffered the largest 
                                                 
18 The actual estimating equation is si60 – si47 = ( ρ  - 1) ν ι 47  + [ ν i60 + ρ  ( ρ  - 1) ε i34].  Our measure of the shock is the 
growth rate between 1940 and 1947 or si47 – si40 = ν ι 47  + [ ρ ε i34 - ε i40].  This is clearly correlated with error term in 
the estimating equation, hence we instrument.   23 
population declines due to bombing tended to have the fastest postwar growth rates, while cities 
whose populations boomed conversely had much lower growth rates thereafter. 
  In Table 2, we present a regression showing the power of our instruments.  Deaths per 
capita and destruction per capita explain about 41 percent of the variance in population growth of 
cities between 1940 and 1947.  Interestingly although both have the expected signs, destruction 
seems to have had a more pronounced effect on the populations of cities.  Presumably, this is 
because, with a few notable exceptions, the number of people killed was only a few percent of 
the city’s population.   
  We now turn to test whether the temporary shocks give rise to permanent effects.  In 
order to estimate equation (4), we regress the growth rate of cities between 1947 and 1960 on the 
growth rate between 1940 and 1947 using deaths and destruction per capita as instruments for 
the wartime growth rates.  The coefficient on growth between 1940 and 1947 corresponds to (ρ  -
1).  In addition, we include government subsidies to cities to control for policies designed to 
rebuild cities.   
If one believes that cities follow a random walk or that catastrophes can permanently alter 
the size of cities, then one should expect the coefficient on the 40-47 growth rate, (ρ  -1), should 
be zero.  If one believes that the temporary shocks have only temporary effects, then the 
coefficient on 40-47 growth should be negative.  A coefficient of minus one indicates that all of 
the shock was dissipated by 1960. 
  The results are presented in Table 3.  The coefficient on 40-47 growth is –1.0, indicating 
that at this interval ρ  is zero.  This means that the typical city completely recovered its former 
relative size within 15 years following the end of World War II.  Given the magnitude of the 
destruction, this is quite surprising. Apparently, US bombing of Japanese cities had no impact on   24 
the typical city’s size in 1960. This strongly rejects the hypothesis that growth in city size share 
is a random walk.   
   As expected, reconstruction subsidies seem to have had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on rebuilding cities. However, the economic impact is quite modest.  Our 
estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in reconstruction expenses would 
increase the size of a city in 1960 by 2.2 percent.  Reconstruction expenses probably had a small 
effect because both the sums spent and the variance in the sums were small.  In the cities that 
suffered the heaviest destruction – Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Osaka – our estimates 
indicate that government reconstruction expenses accounted for less than one percentage point of 
their cumulative growth between 1947 and 1960.  Given that cumulative growth in these cities 
over that period was between 55 and 96 percent, we conclude that reconstruction expenses had 
relatively small impacts.  As we noted earlier, a major reason for this was that reconstruction 
policies, like most Japanese regional policies, disproportionately sent money to rural areas.  As a 
result, the four biggest per capita recipients of assistance were small northern cities that were 
never targeted by US bombers.   
  One potential problem with these results is that it is possible that the US inadvertently 
targeted cities based on underlying growth rates.  While this was not an explicit strategy, we 
cannot rule it out.  If the US bombed rapidly growing cities more heavily, then we may be 
biasing our results downwards.  We therefore repeated our exercise adding the growth rate 
between 1925 and 1940 to our list of independent variables.  This improves the fit, but does not 
qualitatively change the results, although the coefficient on 40-47 growth falls to –0.76.  This 
implies that bombed cities had recovered over three-fourths of their lost growth by 1960.  One 
reasonable question to ask, then, is whether these cities ever returned to their prewar trajectories   25 
or not. If one believes in the location specific model, then one should expect that the coefficient 
on wartime growth should asymptotically approach unity as the end period increases.  In the last 
column of Table 3 we repeat the regression, only now extending the endpoint to 1965 instead of 
1960. The estimated coefficient now reaches –1.0. That is, after controlling for prewar growth 
trends, by 1965 cities have entirely reversed the damage due to the war. Again, the impact of 
reconstruction subsidies also lessens as we move into the future.  Together, these results suggest 
that the effect of the temporary shocks vanishes completely in less than twenty years. 
  One possible objection to our interpretation is that in most cases, the population changes 
corresponded much more to refugees than deaths.  Of the 144 cities with positive casualties, the 
average number of deaths per capita was only 1 percent.  Most of the population movement that 
we observe in our data is due to the fact that the vast destruction of buildings forced people to 
live elsewhere. However, forcing them to move out of their cities for a number of years may not 
have sufficed to overcome the social networks and other draws of their home cities. Hence it 
may seem uncertain whether they are moving back to take advantage of particular characteristics 
of these locations or simply moving back to the only real home they have known. 
  However, there are two cases in which this argument cannot be made: Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. In those cities, the number of deaths was such that if these cities recovered their 
populations, it could not be because residents who temporarily moved out of the city returned in 
subsequent years.  We have already noted that our data underestimates casualties in these cities.  
Even so, our data suggest that the nuclear bombs immediately killed 8.5 percent of Nagasaki’s 
population and 20.8 percent of Hiroshima’s population.  Moreover given that many Japanese 
were worried about radiation poisoning and actively discriminated against atomic bomb victims, 
it is unlikely that residents felt an unusually strong attachment to these cities or that other   26 
Japanese felt a strong desire to move there.  Another reason why these cities are interesting to 
consider is that they were not particularly large or famous cities in Japan.  Their 1940 
populations made them the 8
th and 12
th largest cities in Japan.  Both cities were close to other 
cities of comparable size so that it would have been relatively easy for other cities to absorb the 
populations of these devastated cities. 
  In Figure 2 we plot the population of these two cities.  What is striking in the graph is that 
even in these two cities there is a clear indication that they returned to their prewar growth 
trends.  This process seems to have taken a little longer in Hiroshima than in other cities, but this 
is not surprising given the level of destruction.   
  Taken together, these tests establish that even the spectacular destruction inflicted on 
Japanese cities by the US Strategic Bombing of Japanese cities in WWII had virtually no long 
run impact on the relative size of Japanese cities. Within the space of just twenty years, they 
recovered from the devastation to return to their former place in the constellation of cities. 
 
IV. Three Theories in Light of the Evidence 
  The preceding two sections establish a series of stylized facts about the economic 
geography of Japan. It is now time to collect those facts and consider them in light of the major 
theories. The facts are: (1) A high degree of variation in Japanese regional density has existed at 
all points in time. (2) Zipf’s law holds approximately for the distribution of regional densities 
throughout Japanese history. (3) The variation in regional densities begins to rise in the very 
period that Japan re-opens to the world economy and begins its industrialization. (4) There is 
tremendous persistence in the identity of the most densely settled regions. (5) Even very strong 
temporary shocks have virtually no permanent impact on the relative size of cities.   27 
  The three theories that we have identified are increasing returns (IR), random growth 
(RG), and locational fundamentals (LF). Properly, the IR approach is less a theory than a family 
of theories with common structural elements. Hence we do not think it is appropriate to consider 
our exercises a test of the IR theories. Rather, we will use the facts to consider which of various 
themes that have featured prominently within the IR literature.  We summarize our findings in 
Table 4 where a “+” indicates that the stylized fact is predicted by the theory, a “–” indicates that 
the theory does not predict it, and a question mark indicates that the theory either makes no 
prediction or is ambiguous. 
As a point of analysis, the increasing returns theories frequently ask how spatial 
differentiation may emerge even in a framework in which all locations are identical in terms of 
economic primitives (FKV 1999). From an analytic standpoint, this is precisely the right starting 
point because it emphasizes theoretical features of the IR approach that are unique and 
surprising. However, it is an empirical question how much of the actual variation in regional 
densities owes to IR forces and how much to other factors. An extremely important advantage of 
the long time series with which we work is that it is both able to examine the distribution of 
regional densities for a period in which the forces of increasing returns must have been vastly 
weaker than they are today and also to see if there is a rise in regional variation in the period in 
which the theory predicts there should be.  
The fact that there has been a high degree of variation in regional population densities at 
all points in Japanese history, even those in which increasing returns is most likely of at most 
modest importance, strongly suggest that there are forces quite apart from increasing returns that 
have long been important contributors to this regional variation. However, the fact that the 
variation in regional population density rose precisely in the period in which Japan industrialized   28 
is something that we may well have expected based on the IR approach. This seems reasonably 
strong evidence that IR theories do have something important to contribute to a complete theory 
of economic geography.  
We have noted that the Zipf relation holds reasonably well for the distribution of regional 
densities, just as it does for the distribution of city sizes. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) 
have been very forthright that the IR theories provide no obvious account for the Zipf relation.  
The IR theories do not provide a definitive answer to the degree of persistence one should 
expect in regional densities. One strand of the theory, due to Henderson (1974), ties city sizes to 
technological characteristics of specific industries. Since we are looking over periods with very 
radical shifts in industrial structure, one might on this basis suppose that there would be similarly 
radical shifts in regional densities (which we don’t observe). However, there is an alternative 
tradition within the IR approach, typified by Paul David (2000) and very evident in FKV (1999), 
which stresses the role of path dependence. Small initial advantages cumulate, so that even as the 
industrial structure changes radically, the head start provides an advantage in the next stage of 
locational competition. It seems to us that if one is to interpret the strong locational persistence 
from the perspective of the IR framework that one does need to rely strongly on path 
dependence.  
Finally, again the IR framework does not provide a unique answer to whether temporary 
shocks will have permanent effects. Nonetheless, the investigation of the bombing of Japanese 
cities does prove useful. One of the most striking features of the IR literature is the existence of 
bifurcations in parameter space – what FKV term break points and sustain points – which   29 
separate radically different spatial equilibria.
19 The literature emphasizes as well that because of 
the existence of multiple stable equilibria, there may be irreversibility of these changes even 
when the forces that brought about the initial change are reversed. An important practical 
question, then, is whether such spatial catastrophes are theoretical curiosa or a central tendency 
in the data. Our results provide an unambiguous answer: Even nuclear bombs have little effect on 
relative city sizes over the course of a couple of decades. The theoretical possibility of spatial 
catastrophes due to temporary shocks is not a central tendency borne out in the data. 
The random growth (RG) theory can be discussed briefly. The most important advantage 
of the RG theory over the IR theory is simply that it provides a foundation for understanding the 
Zipf distribution, which is also evident in the distribution of regional densities. The existence of 
substantial variation in regional densities across all of Japanese history is consistent with the RG 
theory provided the stochastic process starts sufficiently far back in time. The persistence of the 
identity of the densely settled regions can be made consistent with the RG theory only if one is 
willing to believe that the variance of growth rates is quite small. The RG theory provides no 
explanation why the industrial revolution in Japan should have been accompanied by a rise in the 
variation in regional densities. However, the most devastating strike against the RG theory 
comes from the examination of the bombing data. The RG theory holds that growth will be a 
random walk. This is strongly rejected by the data on the recovery of Japanese cities in the wake 
of the WWII bombing. Hence we consider this a decisive rejection of the pure RG theory. 
The locational fundamentals (LF) theory holds that there are permanent features of 
specific locations that make these locations an excellent site for economic activity. Access to the 
sea, rivers, and a large plain has been useful at all points in time. Location on a mountaintop, in 
                                                 
19 Formally, a break point is a parameter value that marks a threshold between values for which a symmetric 
equilibrium is stable or not. A sustain point, similarly, is the threshold governing the stability of a concentrated 
equilibrium.    30 
the desert, or in harsh climactic conditions has always been a disadvantage. This provides a very 
natural account of the high degree of variation in regional densities at all points in time. If these 
fundamentals are distributed as suggested by Krugman (1996) and Gabaix (1999), then they also 
provide an account for Zipf’s law. Persistence is highly compatible with this account. Moreover, 
since the bombing of cities would not be expected to affect these fundamentals, the LF theory 
provides a very natural account for the postwar mean reversion of cities. The one area in which 
there seems to be an important shortfall is that the LF theory does not provide an obvious 
explanation for the rise in the variation of regional densities coincident with the industrial 
revolution in Japan.  
 
V. Policy 
  While we do not directly examine any policy interventions, our results are pertinent to 
policy discussions. One of the most important reasons for the renewed interest in economic 
geography is precisely the possibility that in a world of cumulative causation, path dependence, 
and critical break points, even temporary policy interventions may alter the long run spatial 
structure of economic activity. These in turn may have important welfare consequences, 
particularly for immobile factors in the regions favored or not. Our results suggest a great deal 
more stability in the spatial structure of economies than one might have guessed. There is 
tremendous persistence in which regions are most densely settled, even as the economy passes 
through multiple economic revolutions – the rise of agriculture, the rise and decline of feudalism, 
the move to autarky and the reversal to free trade, and finally the rise of the industrial revolution. 
Destruction of half or more of a city’s structures and killing as much as 20 percent of its 
population does little to disturb the long run relative size of a city. In the face of these facts, how   31 
much chance is there that temporary subsidies of economically relevant magnitudes will 
significantly alter the long run spatial structure of an economy?
20 
  Jeffrey Sachs and various co-authors have raised a policy-relevant question bearing on 
issues of economic development.
21 To what extent is geography destiny? Is living in the tropics 
instead of a temperate zone a long run impediment to economic development? Is the lack of a 
coast or navigable rivers an insuperable obstacle to growth? We believe that the evidence we 
provide complements the results of Sachs and others which stress that there are deep, very likely 
geographical, characteristics of particular locations that have a very strong influence on their 
opportunities for growth relative to other locations in a common technological regime. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
  We began with the defining question of economic geography: What gives rise to the 
observed variation in economic activity across regions? It is impossible, of course, to provide 
final answers to such an important question on the basis of one study of the experience of one 
country. Nonetheless, we believe that the present study does allow important progress in 
understanding this question.  
  We examined data on regional population density in Japan from the Stone Age to the 
modern era. We also considered the implications for relative city sizes of the Allied bombing of 
Japanese cities during World War II. These data exercises allowed us to develop a number of key 
stylized facts. Variation in regional population density has been high at all points in time, obeys 
Zipf’s law, and rose in the period coincident with the industrial revolution. There is a great deal 
                                                 
20It is important to note that for these issues, the degree of geographical aggregation may matter. For example, it 
may well be that Tokyo was destined to be a great city, but it may have been harder to say which sub-regions of 
Tokyo would take on the specific character that they have. Similarly, this need not rule out that such subsidies could 
importantly affect the industrial mix as opposed to aggregate activity. 
21Cf. Rappaport and Sachs (2001), Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), etc.   32 
of persistence in the identity of the most densely settled regions. And temporary shocks, even of 
frightening magnitude, appear to have little long run impact on the spatial structure of the 
economy. 
  We then used these facts to consider three prominent theories designed to explain the 
distribution of city sizes. The simple random growth theory of Simon (1955) and Gabaix (1999) 
is decisively rejected by the bombing experiment, since that theory counterfactually predicts that 
city sizes will follow a random walk. The strongest point in favor of the increasing returns theory 
is its clear suggestion that industrialization should have raised the variation of regional densities, 
a prediction confirmed by the data. The locational fundamentals theory emerges as an important 
part of a full account. It can explain why there is a great deal of variation in regional densities 
long before increasing returns is a plausible account; it explains why the densities obey Zipf’s 
law – something the increasing returns theory cannot do; it predicts a great deal of persistence in 
the distribution of regional densities; and it predicts that even quite large temporary shocks will 
have little long run impact. The one dimension in which the increasing returns theory clearly 
dominates the locational fundamentals theory is the account that it provides of the rise in the 
variation of regional densities in the period of industrialization. Taken together, these 
considerations lead us to favor a hybrid theory in which locational fundamentals play a leading 
role in accounting for the spatial pattern of relative regional densities, but increasing returns may 
help to determine the degree of spatial differentiation. 




















with 1998 History 
-6000 to 
-300  125 0.39  2.46 -0.809 
(0.217)  0.53 0.31 
Hunter-gatherer society, not ethnically Japanese, no metal tools or 
agriculture. 
-300 to 
300  595 0.23  0.93 -1.028 
(0.134)  0.67 0.50 
First appearance of primitive agriculture and ethnically Japanese 
people.  Some metallurgical skills, some coins, no writing or cloth. 
725 4511  0.20  0.72  -1.207 
(0.133)  0.60 0.71 
Creation of feudal regime, population censuses begin, writing well 
developed, farming is widespread. Capital is Nara. 
800 5506  0.18  0.75  -1.184 
(0.152)  0.57 0.68 
Capital Moves to Kyoto. Property rights for peasant farmers 
continue to improve leading to greater cultivation. 
900 7442  0.29  0.68  -1.230 
(0.166)  0.48 0.65 
Use of metallic farm tools doubles over average for previous 300 
years. Improved irrigation and dry-crop technology. 
1150 6836  0.20  0.66  -1.169 
(0.141)  0.53 0.73 
Multiple civil wars especially in (rice-rich) northern Japan.  
General political instability and rebellions. 
1600 12266  0.30  0.64  -1.192 
(0.068)  0.76 0.83 
Reunification achieved after bloody  war, extensive contact with 
West. Japan is a major regional trading and military power. 
1721 31290  0.21  0.43  -1.582 
(0.113)  0.85 0.84 
Closure of Japan to trade with minor exceptions around Nagasaki. 
Capital moves to Tokyo. Political stability achieved. 
1798 30531  0.21  0.37  -1.697 
(0.120)  0.83 0.81 
Population is approximately 80% farmers, 6% nobility.  Population 
stability attributed to infanticide, birth control, and famines. 
1872 33748  0.18  0.30  -1.877 
(0.140)  0.76 0.78 
Collapse of shogun's government, civil war, jump to free trade, end 
of feudal regime, start subsidized import of foreign technology 
1920 53032  0.25  0.43  -1.476 
(0.043)  0.94 0.93 
Industrialization and militarization in full swing, but still 50% of 
labor force is farmers.  Japan is a major exporter of silk and 
textiles. 
1998 119486  0.41  1.00  -0.963 
(0.025)  1.00 1.00  Japan is a fully industrialized country, Tokyo, with a population of 
12 million, is one of the largest cities in the world. 
Note: Population for years prior to 725 is based on Koyama (1978).  All time periods have 39 regions with Hokkaido and Okinawa dropped from all years.  The 
relative variance of the log population is the variance of the log of population density in year t divided by the variance of the log of population density in 1998.  
The Zipf coefficient is from a regression of log rank on log population density using 1920 log density as instruments for the years prior to 725 and 1998 data for 
later years. Standard errors are in parentheses.  The correlation columns indicate the raw and rank correlations between regional density in a given year and 
regional density in 1998. Table 2 
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Table 3 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Impact of Bombing on Cities 
 (Instruments: deaths per capita and buildings destroyed per capita) 
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2  0.279 0.566  0.386 
Number of Observations  303  303  303 
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Table 4 
 
Match Between Theories and Predictions 
 
Stylized Fact  Increasing Returns  Random Growth  Locational Fundamentals 
Large Variation in 
Regional Densities 
at all Times  - +  + 
Zipf’s Law  - +  + 
Rise in Variation 
with Industrial 
Revolution  + -  - 
Persistence in 
Regional Densities  ? ?  + 
Mean Reversion 
After Temporary 
Shocks  ? -  + 
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Appendix I 
 
Details on the Construction of Regional Population Data 
 
  Japan has one of the most complete sets of historical regional census data of any country 
in the world.  A major reason why data was collected on a regional level is that while Japan was 
unified in theory, in practice local lords often had substantial autonomy and Japanese 
government records reflected this.  Until the mid 1870’s Japan was divided into 68 provinces or 
kuni.  However one of the kuni, Ezo, now Hokkaido, reported data very erratically due to the low 
Japanese population and was dropped from our sample.  These data were collected as a part of 
the Japanese tax system envisaged in the Taika reform of 646.  However, a series of 
assassinations, coups, and civil wars delayed full-scale implementation until 702.  At that time, 
cultivators over the age of 6 were allocated land from the government and in return had to pay 
lump sum in-kind taxes. (Hall p. 54).  This forced the government’s Popular Affairs Ministry to 
keep detailed population and tax records many of which exist today.   
  The raw census data is hard to use, because censuses were done infrequently and often 
included different standards for covering samurai, non-land holders, women, children, etc.  For 
example, Kii did not report people under the age of 8 while other provinces reported significantly 
younger children.  Over the last 75 years, due in large measure to enormous efforts on the part of 
Japanese historical demographers, notably Sawada (1927), Sekiyama (1958), and Kito (1999), 
these data have been carefully organized and rendered systematic.  This typically involves 
incorporating procedures to estimate the missing youth population based on age distributions in 
neighboring regions. 
  Our data on regional population between 725 and 1872 is based on Kito (1996).  The 
Kito dataset represents the culmination of these efforts by providing best estimates of the 
provincial population for 725, 800, 900, and 1150.  For these years, data is either based on actual 
census data where available or on the number of "villages" (go) per province.  In the Japanese 
system used at the time, each "village" or go was comprised of three hamlets containing 50 
households per hamlet.  Hence, if one can estimate the number of family members per 
household, based on existing household data in some regions, one can obtain reasonable 
estimates of the regional population based on the number of "villages".   
  How well this method works can be assessed by how well these estimates conform to 
subsequent discoveries of census data.  For example, Farris (1984, p. 175) reports that after 
Sawada (1927) did his original analysis, archaeologists uncovered actual census data for Hitachi 
province in the year 800, a missing datum in Sawada.  Sawada’s estimate of 217,000 residents 
was quite close to the census number of 190,000. 
  Data for 1600 is based on a major cadastral survey conducted under the order of Shogun 
Hideyoshi Toyotomi.  The frequency of census data increases from 1721 when Japan began to 
use these censuses as part of their anti-Christian campaign.  Unfortunately, there were no 
regional censuses taken between 1872 and 1920. Although some authors report figures for the 
intervening years, these are largely interpolations between the two end points.  
  Another complication arises from the fact that historical regional data is based on 68 
provinces whose boundaries do not correspond precisely to the 47 prefectures used in modern 
census reporting.  For example, the province of Musashi was broken up into two prefectures, 
Tokyo and Saitama.  Others are harder to map into modern prefectures – e.g. the province Kii 
contains all of Wakayama prefecture and part of Mie.  Feudal lords in Japan ruled over several   43 
hundred domains, which, in general did not have boundaries that correspond to provincial 
boundaries.  The borders of these domains changed significantly over the course of the next 
millennium in response to wars and patronage, but the borders of the provinces did not. We 
solved this problem by using a historical map provided by Hanley and Yamamura (1977) and 
comparing it with modern maps.  This generates a concordance, which we present in Appendix 
Table 1. We then checked our matching by comparing the aggregate area of the provinces [from 
the 1882 Japanese Imperial Statistical Yearbook] with the areas of corresponding prefectures 
[from the 1998 Japan Statistical Yearbook].  This suggests that we matched the data quite 
closely. 
   We measured regional density as the number of people per square kilometer.  One 
problem that can arise is that regional definitions using provincial data may be slightly different 
from those using prefectural data.  In order to eliminate this problem, we implemented the 
following procedure. Whenever we formed a region using provincial population data we deflated 
it with provincial area data.  Likewise, whenever we formed a region using prefectural 
population data, we deflated using prefectural area data. 
  While there is a very large literature in Japan on the accuracy of historical numbers, most 
researchers believe that the population numbers, at least from 1721 onwards, are accurate to 
within 15 percent.  The reason that we have a good sense about the accuracy is that in a few 
cases provincial boundaries and feudal domain boundaries coincided. Sometimes the feudal lord 
in these areas would conduct an independent population census of his domain, and then we can 
compare the results of the two surveys. So, for example, in the province of Bizen, central 
government data puts the 1798 population at 321,221 while the lord of Okayama believed the 
total to be 320,795.  However, both of these numbers underreport the population of the castle 
town, which Hanley and Yamamura (1977) suggest would take the total to 342,013.  The point, 
of course, is that while the data from 1721 onwards is far from perfect, the level of measurement 
error is not so high as to render the data meaningless. 
  Prior to 725, it is also possible to obtain estimates of the Japanese population based on 
archeological evidence.  Japan has been populated for at least 10,000 years and there are 28,013 
archaeological sites from the Jomon period (-8000 to –300) and another 10,530 sites from the 
Yayoi period (-300 to 300).  Koyama (1978) has divided categorized these sites by prefecture 
and they can be used to provide a rough idea of the regional distribution of population by 
prefecture.   
 
 
Details on Urban Data 
 
  There are two principal sources of information on death and destruction caused by World 
War II in Japan: the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) (1947) and Nakamura and 
Miyazaki (1995).  This latter source is basically a reprint of “The Report on Damage and 
Casualties of World War II” compiled by The Central Economic Stabilization Board (CESB) in 
1949.  The US source is particularly good for matching death and destruction to particular US air 
operations, while the Japanese source is a 600-page census of all death and destruction that 
occurred within Japan proper.  As such, the Japanese source provides a more complete record of 
how the war affected civilians. 
  Since our primary interest was obtaining information on the magnitude of shocks to cities 
regardless of the particular air operation that gave rise to it, we felt the Japanese source was more   44 
appropriate.  Japanese numbers for casualties and destruction tend to be larger than the numbers 
reported above for a number of reasons.  First, the USSBS only covers destruction due to 
planned strategic bombing.  It therefore does not include urban deaths due to other bombing 
activities, strafing, naval bombardments of coastal cities, and the mining of harbors, nor does it 
cover destruction arising from accidentally bombing the wrong targets.  Second, US fatality data 
appear to be only reported for confirmed deaths.  In nuclear bombing and firebombing, it is quite 
common for thousands, if not tens of thousands of people, to be vaporized.  People who went 
missing on the day of a bombing raid and did not turn up within several years are not counted as 
casualties in US sources but are listed as missing in CESB and are added to fatality numbers.
22   
Third, US data does not treat mortally injured people as fatalities, whereas Japanese data does.  
This is particularly a problem in Hiroshima and Nagasaki where large numbers of people died of 
radiation poisoning within a few years of the attack.  This helps explain why the CESB reports 
twice as many fatalities in Nagasaki as USSBS.  A more difficult issue concerns radiation-
induced deaths in the period between 1949 and 1965.  However, since direct deaths were so 
large, even high estimates (in the tens of thousands) of the number dying from radiation do not 
affect our numbers on deaths per capita very much.   
  Population data were taken from the Kanketsu Showa Kokusei Soran.  A key feature of 
this source is that city areas are held constant across the time period.  This data source reports 
urban populations for several hundred cities based on censuses every five years.
23  The only 
exception is 1945.  The 1945 census of cities was not performed until 1947 due to the war.  This 
is actually fortunate for us.  Japanese ground transportation was largely unaffected by the war.  
This means that by 1947, anyone who had fled due to the fear of air strikes, could have returned 
provided that housing and employment existed there. 
 
                                                 
22 One might worry that the missing category might be capturing something else, but the number of people reported 
missing in cities not subject to bombing is almost always zero. 
23 We dropped the city of Kure from our data.  Kure became the site of a major Japanese naval arsenal.  As a result 
its population rose 50% between 1925 and 1940 as Japan built up its fleet.  Kure was heavily bombed during the war 
and then returned to its prewar size as demand for naval warships approached zero.   45 
Appendix Table 1 
 
Concordance between Provinces and Prefectures 
 
Province (Kuni)  Prefecture (Ken) 
Iwaki, Iwashiro, Rikuzen, Rikuchu, and Mutsu  Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima 
Uzen-Ugo Akita,  Yamagata 
Awa1, Kazusa, Shimo-osa  Chiba 
Awa2 Tokushima 
Bingo, Aki  Hiroshima 
Bungo Oita 
Chikuzen, Buzen, Chikugo  Fukuoka 
Echigo, Sado  Niigata 
Etchu Toyama 
Harima, Tajima, Awaji  Hyogo 
Higo Kumamoto 
Hitachi Ibaraki 
Hizen, Tsushima, Iki  Nagasaki-Saga 
Hyuga Miyazaki 
Iga, Ise, Shima  Mie 
Inaba, Hoki  Tottori 
Iyo Ehime 
Izumo, Iwami, Oki  Shimane 
Kaga, Noto  Ishikawa 
Kai Yamanashi 
Kawachi, Izumi, Settsu  Osaka 
Kii Wakayama 
Kozuke Gunma 
Mimasaka, Bizen, Bitchu  Okayama 
Mino, Hida  Gifu 
Musashi Tokyo-Saitama 
Omi Shiga 
Osumi, Satsuma  Kagoshima 





Suo, Nagato  Yamaguchi 
Tosa Kochi 
Totomi, Suruga, Izu  Shizuoka 
Wakasa, Echizen  Fukui 
Yamashiro, Tamba, Tango  Kyoto 
Yamato Nara 
 